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Speaking of rencontres, of meetings or encounters, it is difficult not to think of the 2003 
conference at Sussex University, Encounters with Derrida, where I first heard from Nicholas 
Royle that Jacques Derrida was gravely ill. 1  How does one speak about what is beside or 
against, at once beside and against, after the death of Jacques Derrida? 
To meet Derrida, if such a thing is possible, with the question of the contre, I think of 
finding myself sitting beside Samuel Weber in late 1992 in Derrida’s seminar in Paris with a 
dog-eared copy of Glas in front of me, and only realising that it was Samuel Weber after he 
passed along the book that we all had to write our signatures in before a meeting with Derrida 
could begin.  To meet Derrida in the institution, we had to sign our name, make a collective 
signature, a countersignature, and leave a trace to get things started. 
I also find myself thinking of the last time I saw Jacques Derrida.  In late March 1994 I 
was walking on the Rue Soufflot, crossing the philosopher’s road, the Rue Victor Cousin, 
when I was almost hit by a car.  I looked up and saw the driver: it was Jacques Derrida.  





Writing in 2003 of the archives of Hélène Cixous – which, like all archives, cannot avoid 
the mal d’archive of being a part that is greater than the whole that would encompass it, a 
trace that cannot be reduced either to a subject or to a monument – Derrida evokes a certain 
genius that ‘perhaps consists always in finding oneself [se trouver], not only in finding one’s 
self, in discovering or inventing oneself, in falling or falling back on oneself, but in finding 
oneself, as much through events in a quasi random way here or there, in the place of the 
other, as the other in place of the other’ (my emphasis). 2   
To meet is to find oneself ‘in the place of the other’.  Without the other coming upon me 
by chance, philosophy could not begin.  As Socrates says: ‘I was going from the Academy 
straight to the Lyceum … when … I fell in with Hippothales’; ‘I went down yesterday to the 
Piraeus with Glaucon … at that instant Polemarchus the son of Cephalus chanced to catch 
sight of us’; ‘My dear Phaedrus, whence come you, and whither are you going?’ 3 
But after Plato, Derrida asks in a paper from 1982, ‘What are my chances of reaching my 
addressees, whether I calculate and prepare a meeting place … or whether I hope to fall upon 
them by chance?’ 4  Derrida adds here that he is underling the word rencontre, and that is 
what I would like do today: to underline the word rencontre and to what see what are my 
chances and the mischances that give me no chance. 5  
To meet, Derrida suggested, is to find oneself finding (se trouver trouver) what has never 
been found before, what can only be found in the way and out in front (contra), ‘as if it found 








Rencontre has retained two quite different meanings – two meanings that are at once 
conforming and contesting – to meet, to come upon, to encounter by chance and to meet in 
conflict, to collide, to fight a duel. 7 
In the rencontre – the meeting or the duel – there is a blow, a hit, a strike, a collision.  I 
am turning the corner and by chance I run into the other, the other runs into me: contact is 
made.  The speeds are always either too fast or too slow to stop me running headlong, sans 
cap, into the other. 8  The meeting always starts with a blow. 
From his introduction to The Origin of Geometry (1962) to On Touching – Jean-Luc 
Nancy (1992-2000) Derrida was preoccupied with Aristotle’s De Anima, On the Soul, reading 
the great treatise on the diaphanous as the unseen origin of seeing, as the structure of the not 
x but the possibility of x which the Idea in the Kantian sense plays in phenomenology, and 
perhaps making the case for a new “history” of the senses: plus de cinq (no more five, more 
than five, never five-in-one).  Aristotle argued that there could be no sound without a blow: a 
thing ‘must be struck with a sudden sharp blow, if it is to sound’ (419b).  The Greek ear is a 
wondrous machine: an internal buffer that regulates the sharp blows from the outside.  At the 
same time, as Derrida points out, it is a membrane that cannot stop vibrating and registering 
‘the blows from the outside’. 9   
In On Touching Derrida evokes the blows and caresses which exceed the untouchable soul 
as the origin of the senses, of everything that is touched or touches.  For Aristotle, touch is an 
‘exactness of discrimination’, the pure difference – the intuition – of touching (421a). 10  For 
Derrida, it is always a matter of a gap, of the spacing of a gap – of and as contact.  When it 
comes to the blows of the chance encounter, there is always a gap – a gap that moves. 11  
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Perhaps the resonance of the contre in rencontre is found in the gaps and blows, in the 
unavoidable duel of proximity, the polemos of the Ent-fernung. 12 
‘But how many of us are there?’. 13  Littré defines the duel as an unpremeditated single 
combat between two living men.  For Derrida, from the start, there will always be more than 
two and he will question both the inevitable fraternity of this chance encounter and the 
assumption that it is only the living who can duel. 14  There is always the desire for the 
perfect duel: ‘no one would ever encounter anyone, I would finally be alone with you’. 15  
From the start, in the formality of the pre-arranged – and always still surprising – duel, 
there are the seconds, the doubles who supplement the principal combatants, who carry – 
tragen – not only the challenge, but also the body and the name of the duellist. 16  As an act 
of friendship, of love perhaps: always as an unavoidable and impossible mourning. 17  And 
Derrida cannot stop dreaming of, cannot stop mourning, the blinding duel between fathers 
and sons. 18 
 
And Yaakov was left alone–– 
Now a man wrestled with him until the coming of the dawn. … 
Then he said: 
Let me go, 
for dawn has come up! 
But Yaakov said: 
I will not let you go 
Unless you bless me. 19 
 
Since at least Cervantes – or perhaps Jacob – literature has been wrestling with angels, 
caught up in the chance encounter, the imaginary duel, the duel with the imaginary.  In 
‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’ (1915) – no doubt a good title for many of the 
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papers in this conference – Freud argued that in the midst of war we tend to ‘reconcile 
ourselves with death’ through the fictions of death: ‘we die in the person of a given hero, yet 
we survive him, and are ready again with the next hero just as safely’. 20  For Derrida, la vie 
la mort or la survivance is the finitude of a meeting or duel that remains irreconcilable, that 
keeps taking us – without rest – ‘before and beyond the opposition between living and 
dying’. 21  
Like the secret that can only be a secret if you tell someone you have a secret, the duel 
needs witnesses. 22  It is a strange meeting: a chance encounter with all the seeming 
preparations of seconds and witnesses.  One can see this in Romeo and Juliet, a work that 
Derrida described as ‘the mise-en-scène of all duels’. 23  Benvolio warns Mercutio, ‘the 
Capels are abroad / And if we meet we shall not scape a brawl’. 24  Benvolio and Mercutio 
are prepared, and yet the duel remains an event that cannot be planned.  There is perhaps, 
since Shakespeare or after Derrida, an economy of the meeting, of the duel: it is the economy 
of a proximity, of a bringing or coming close than cannot be separated from the contingency 
of the chance encounter, of running into the other. 25     
Benvolio begins the scene of the duel with the possibility of the chance meeting (‘if we 
meet we shall not scape a brawl’) and, from the other side, Tybalt will say to his companions, 
‘Follow me close’. 26  The chance of proximity, of proximity as chance would be a gathering 
that cannot re-collect itself and cannot be equated with the Heideggerian Versammlung. 27  
This strange economy of a kind closeness that relies on the chance encounter can be seen in 
the introduction to Nicholas Royle’s recent illuminating book on Shakespeare.  ‘The seven 
words I have singled out for close reading, ‘ he writes, ‘are likewise not uniquely special 
words that sum up Shakespeare’s work.  I happened upon them, in some respects, by chance’ 
(my emphasis). 28 
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We meet, close, but so different; we duel, not too kill, but only to draw first blood. 29  But 
when we make words, the worst can always happen: 
 
TYBALT: A word with one of you. 
MERCUITO:  And but one word with one of us?  Couple it with something: make
       it a word and a blow. 30 
 
In the violence of the duel, there always needs to be more than ‘one word’, and words alone 
are not enough.  Make a neologism, Mercutio taunts, join the one word ‘with something’: 
make it two, make something monstrous, make ‘it a word and a blow’: a word that hits, that 
strikes – a word like rencontre. 
When Derrida recalls the date – this very day, this singular date, that gives itself to the 
chance of another day, to any and every day – when he first met Cixous, de Man, Hillis 
Miller, Blanchot or Gadamer, we cannot know if these rencontres were meetings or duels, if 
they were blows or caresses. 31 
Meetings and duels, blows and caresses, with the living and the dead.  Recalling his 
meetings with Blanchot, which first started in May 1968 with a discussion over their ethical 
and political differences, Derrida writes, ‘the silences, the necessary respiration of ellipsis 
and discretion, during these interviews, were also, as far as I remember, the blessed time, 
without the least interruption, the unbroken time of a smile, a trusting and benevolent 




‘The Prince expressly hath / Forbid this bandying in Verona streets’, Romeo pleads, a 
swords thrust away from Tybalt killing Mercuito. 33  The private duel is always before the 
law, it cannot avoid becoming public.  Benvolio warns: ‘We talk here in the public haunt of 
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men. / Either withdraw into some private place … or depart.  Here all eyes gaze upon us’.  
Mercutio replies: ‘Men’s eyes were made to look, and let them gaze’. 34 
Some eighteen years after Romeo and Juliet, Francis Bacon would address the problem of 
‘private duels’ in The Charge touching duels (1614).  As the Attorney General, Bacon is 
acting ‘by his Majesty’s direction’ to make the case against private duels. 35  For Bacon, it is 
a question not only of duels, but of a private violence, of the violence of the private: when 
‘private men begin once to presume to give law to themselves, and to right their own wrongs, 
no man can foresee the dangers and inconviencies that may arise and multiply thereupon’. 36 
This is the hyperbole of an untamed and unreclaimed private violence that Hobbes will later 
evoke to launch what Derrida called the phantasm of an indivisible sovereignty. 37 
For Bacon, the private duel has the power to threaten the king himself: ‘it may grow from 
quarrels to banding, and from banding to trooping, and so to tumult and commotion’.  From 
one chance encounter, from one unique collision of proximity and chance, the public space, 
the sovereign power and the state itself could collapse.  At stake is the law itself.  Private 
duels ‘expressly gives the law an affront, as if there were two laws’. 38   
In The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Kant accords a similar power to the duel.  A duel is 
a public return to a state of nature governed by a sense of honour, which is valued more than 
life itself. 39  For Kant, the duel creates a gap between the people’s subjective sense of justice 
and the state’s objective claim to public justice.  The state can neither execute the duellist 
(and deny honour), nor can it condone an unlawful killing.  The duel suspends the right of the 
sovereign power to punish crimes with the death penalty.  One kind of honour suspends 
another since, as Derrida points out, it is precisely the propriety of a sacrifice above and 
beyond life that gives the death penalty its sovereign right. 40  The duel threatens the death 
penalty, the sovereignty of sacrifice which, as Derrida argues, becomes the transcendental 
possibility of the law. 41  
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For Bacon things were somewhat simpler.  The ‘State’, he argues must ‘abolish’ private 
duels and by convincing the would-be duellists that even one singular private duel is an 
‘insult against the King’s power and authority … he shall see the law and rule of State 
disinterest him of a vain and unnecessary hazard’. 42   Bacon uses the word disinterest here as 
a verb: to rid or divest of interest.  The OED also suggests that this is the first instance of the 
word disinterest in English.  In response to the private duel, Bacon makes a word and a blow.  
In the seventeenth and eighteenth century disinterest becomes the concept par excellence 
for trying to resolve the duel between the public and the private.  In What is Enlightenment? 
(1784) Kant transforms the tradition of disinterest by arguing that to serve the interests of the 
state and in the state is a private use of reason. By insisting that the public use of reason 
exceeds the borders of the state, Kant internationalises disinterest. 43  However, in the 1790s 
when it comes to his own public-private duel with the king, Kant ends up secreting away, 
encrypting this international disinterest, holding it back for another, brighter day. 44  The 
international (the more than public) becomes a secret and, as Derrida warned in the context of 
the university, the institution must also resist the temptation to claim a propriety over what 
exceeds the state, to foreclose the more than private. 45  This international disinterest, Derrida 
suggested, also becomes the very possibility of abolishing the death penalty that Kant had 
equated with the unassailable equality of justice and a state-run categorical imperative. 46 
If there is a disinterest in Derrida’s work, after Kant, after Nietzsche and after Lévinas, it 
is a disinterest that begins with interest: as I take an interest – in the impossible – I am taken 
away from myself, by and for the other.  Speaking in 1975, Derrida said, ‘when I write ‘what 
interests me’, I am designating not only an object of interest, but the place that I am in the 
middle of, and precisely this place that I cannot exceed’. 47  I find myself, I am found, by 
chance in the collision of a public-private meeting, and I am dis-interested.  Perhaps this is 
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the possibility of a kind of a countering-institution, or at least the mad ‘dream of an other 
institution’. 48  
As Derrida noted, within the institution his own work was defined as disinterested 
research and, at the same time, had to contend with a violent and ‘voracious interest’ both in 
and outside of the academic institution. 49  Derrida suggested that a countering-institution 
would, on the one hand, have to exceed the traditional concept of disinterest and challenge 
the interests behind claims to disinterest and, on the other hand, reinhabit this tradition by 
identifying, reducing and resisting voracious interests.  A countering institution would have 
to take an interest, a decisive and responsible interest from the impossible, a dis-interest that 
would leave it, as Simon Morgan-Wortham has suggested, ‘a bit mad’. 50 
 
AVANT ET DEVANT 
 
Since at least ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ (1964) Derrida was preoccupied with the contre 
in rencontre.  For Lévinas, the encounter with the absolutely other is the absolute encounter. 
It is ‘the encounter’, Derrida notes, and ‘the only way out’.  The encounter is absolutely 
unforeseeable, absolutely unanticipatable.  But absolute difference is never the ‘way out’, if 
there is ever a ‘way out’.  Derrida writes: ‘doubtless this encounter of the unforeseeable itself 
is the only possible opening of time, the only pure future, the only pure expenditure beyond 
history as economy.  But this future, this beyond, is not another time, a day after history.  It is 
present at the heart of experience.  Present not as a total presence but as a trace’. 51  Derrida 
never stopped talking about the present (with a trace), about the urgency of the here and now: 
the meeting is always imminent. 52 
I find myself – I never stop finding myself – in a chance encounter, in the strange collision 
of proximity and chance that gives itself to another meeting, a meeting that is always before 
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me and in front of me, avant et devant, at once behind and ahead of me. 53  The meeting has 
started: it is too late and I can only start again – with the other: 
 
it’s all the same to me … everything unforeseen that might happen, arrive, every 
encounter [rencontre]   
and me, I run, I am going to encounter you [je vais à ta rencontre] without 
hoping for anything that is not strictly chance – and fortuitously encountered 
[rencontre]. … Toward this fortuitously encountered encounter [cette rencontre 
de rencontre], I make my way backwards … You have closed my eyes, and my 
eyes closed I go to encounter you, to the encounter of you [je vais à ta rencontre, 
à la rencontre de toi] … Je vais à ta rencontre, this is all that I know in myself, 
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